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ARTICLES
PUNISHING TERRORISTS: CONGRESS, THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE
GUIDELINES, AND THE COURTS
George D. Brown*
There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the law and policy of
federal sentencing.  This uncertainty can be traced to United States v.
Booker, in which the Supreme Court struck down the existing system of
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but preserved them as “advi-
sory.”  Federal courts at all three levels have since struggled with the
legal status of the Guidelines and how to apply them.  The Court’s recent
decision in Peugh v. United States seems to treat the Guidelines as true
“law.”
This uncertainty has serious consequences for the “War on Terror.”
The Article III courts are the principal forum in which terrorism suspects
are tried.  If guilty, the suspects’ sentences will often be pushed sharply
upward by the operation of the “terrorism enhancement” of the Guide-
lines.  Courts are split on how to apply the enhancement.  Its status as an
advisory mandatory minimum—reflecting a “get tough” policy that
originated in Congress—is in tension with goals of individualized
sentencing.
This Article examines that tension’s origins in Booker and examines
how it has played out at both the trial and appellate levels in cases ap-
plying the enhancement.  The Article also recommends drawing a dis-
tinction between cases where district courts depart from the
enhancement based on an individualized application of the basic federal
sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and cases based on a policy
disagreement with the enhancement.  The Article criticizes the latter ap-
proach, and calls on appellate courts to overturn sentences based on it.
The result may be a set of special rules for terrorism cases.  However,
the enhancement’s congressional origins and recent Supreme Court de-
cisions in such diverse areas as standing, pleading, and freedom of
speech support this approach.
* Robert F. Drinan, S.J. Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., Harvard
University, 1961; L.L.B., Harvard Law School, 1965.  The author would like to thank Re-
search Assistant Brian Reilly and Mary Ann Neary of the Boston College Law School Library
for their invaluable help.  Professor Michael Cassidy read an early draft.
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INTRODUCTION: A JUDICIAL PERFECT STORM
For nearly a decade, federal sentencing law—particularly the status
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—has been in disarray.  In a single
2005 case, United States v. Booker,1 the Supreme Court rendered two
decisions by different majorities.  The first, or “merits,”2 decision held
that the substantial role played by the judge in administering the Guide-
lines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.3  The “reme-
dial”4 decision, rendered by a different majority, declared that the answer
to this defect was to treat the Guidelines as advisory.5  The Court re-
mains deeply divided on the status and role of the Guidelines, as evi-
denced by the most recent term’s decision in Peugh v. United States.6
The Peugh decision treated the Guidelines more as binding law than ad-
visory, holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated when a defen-
1 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005) (dealing with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).  The
Court previously invalidated state sentencing guidelines in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004).
2 See NORMAN ABRAMS, SARA SUN BEALE & SUSAN RIVA KLEIN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT, 982–84 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing the merits and remedial
majorities).
3 Booker, 543 U.S. at 236, 244.
4 ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 2, at 982–84. R
5 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
6 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2088 (2013).
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dant receives a higher sentence as a result of Guidelines promulgated
after his offense.7
The lower courts are equally in disarray.  District judges are unclear
as to how much discretion they possess after Booker.  Some are inclined
to emphasize their discretion, focusing on the requirements of the general
federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),8 while others take refuge
in the Guidelines.9  The courts of appeals are equally divided on their
role in reviewing sentences that depart from the Guidelines.  Some em-
phasize the trial court’s familiarity with the case and the themes of defer-
ence to trial courts and limited appellate review that can frequently be
found in Supreme Court opinions on the issue.10  Others emphasize that
review must be meaningful,11 and that trial judges do not have a “blank
check.”12  Sharp divisions within a court of appeals are not uncommon.13
These disagreements and uncertainties are particularly acute in the
context of what used to be called the “War on Terror.”  Indeed, they may
have an impact on society’s ability to conduct that war.  After an initial
flirtation with such alternatives as military tribunals and “national secur-
ity courts,”14 the political system has settled on the Article III courts as
the forum in which domestic terrorists will be tried as criminals under
existing criminal statutes.
Yet, when it comes to punishing those who have been found guilty,
or who have pleaded guilty, courts send mixed messages.  The problem
is particularly acute in the case of “preventive prosecutions.”15  These
somewhat problematic prosecutions involve defendants who have not yet
committed, or attempted to commit, classic acts of terrorism such as at-
tacking public buildings and events.  Thus, rather than committing an act
of terrorism, the defendants in these cases seem to have been preparing
themselves to be the sort of person who would commit such acts.  They
are guilty of such actions as receiving military training, usually abroad,
taking an “oath” to support a terrorist organization, and discussing (both
7 Id. at 2081–85.
8 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
9 See Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (noting the district courts’ tendency to follow the
Guidelines).
10 For examples of cases discussing the issues of deference and appellate review, see
generally Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338
(2007); and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
11 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 147 (2d Cir. 2009).
12 United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2008)).
13 E.g., Stewart, 590 F.3d 93; United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008).
14 See, e.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., COUNTERTERRORISM LAW, 673–76 (2d ed. 2012)
(discussing national security court proposals).
15 See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007).
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generally and specifically) acts of terrorism.16  Treating such persons as
“criminals” raises difficult questions.  How to punish them raises others.
The major source of these questions is section 3A1.4 of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: the “terrorism enhancement.”17  To understand its poten-
tially “draconian”18 impact, one must first have a basic understanding of
how the Guidelines operate.  The Appendix shows their initial operation.
All federal crimes are grouped according to offense characteristics and
assigned a base offense level.19  For example, a given crime may have a
base offense level of 12, which can be found on the vertical axis.20  From
this point of departure, the judge would consider whether there were any
specific aggravating or mitigating offense characteristics, such as posses-
sion of a firearm.21  He or she would then consider possible further ad-
justments based on such factors as the victim,22 the defendant’s role,23
and the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.24  Assuming a simple
one-count case that did not trigger any other adjustments, the judge’s
analysis would then move horizontally on the criminal history axis.25  If
the defendant had no record of prior criminal activity, the inquiry would
end with the base level of 12, yielding a sentencing range of 10–16
months.26  The judge would have discretion within this range.27
The terrorism enhancement takes a wrecking ball to this carefully
constructed edifice.  The Sentencing Commission adopted the enhance-
ment at the direction of Congress.28  It provides, in part, that “[i]f the
offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal
crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if the resulting offense level
is less than 32, increase to level 32.”29  The enhancement also provides
for an automatic criminal history of VI,30 the highest point on the scale.31
Turning to the grid, this enhancement causes the sentencing range for a
16 United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2011); see Chesney, supra note
15, at 474–92 (discussing the use of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A in anticipatory prosecutions).  Section R
2339A punishes provision of material support to terrorists.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012).
17 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2013).
18 James P. McLoughlin, Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Sec-
tion 3A1.4: Sentencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
tions, 28 LAW & INEQ. 51, 53 (2010).
19 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(2).
20 See infra Appendix.
21 See ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 2, at 971. R
22 See id. at 972.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 971.
25 See infra Appendix.
26 Infra Appendix.
27 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3 (2013).
28 See McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 51. R
29 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a).
30 Id. cmt. n.3.
31 See infra Appendix.
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level 12 base offense to jump from 10–16 months to 210–262 months.32
However, the statutory maximum may be less than the enhancement
range.33  Although one can find language to the contrary,34 applications
of the Guidelines cannot lead to a sentence exceeding the statutory maxi-
mum.35  If there is more than one count, however, the enhancement
could lead to consecutive sentences, pushing the length of the punish-
ment upward.36
The enhancement is controversial.  Some judges don’t like it, and
seem to seek ways around it.37  Courts of appeals, however, have re-
versed judges who refuse to apply the enhancement or who have diluted
it substantially.38  There is also a serious question as to whether the en-
hancement represents a sound way of dealing with persons whose terror-
ist path is far from clear.  Does it provide deterrence and incapacitation,
or does it promote overkill and produce martyrs?
This Article takes the position that the enhancement represents an
important public policy—a statement about terrorism—that should not
be lightly abandoned.  The fact that it stems from a congressional direc-
tive enforces its status, rather than weakens it.  It is true that the enhance-
ment represents a sort of judicial “perfect storm”: the interaction of
uncertain sentencing law with a controversial sentencing policy.  As de-
veloped below, however, I think that many of the objections to it are not
well-founded.  I concede that it is, to paraphrase one district judge, a
“blunt instrument,”39 a sort of nonbinding mandatory minimum.  The an-
swer to this problem is, in my view, to affirm the discretion of trial
judges to modify the enhancement’s application in individual cases,
while clarifying and limiting the grounds on which they may do so.  How
those judges should proceed, and how appellate courts should review
them, are the central questions addressed in this Article.
Part I of the Article examines the complex world of federal sentenc-
ing under the now “advisory” Guidelines.  The analysis begins with the
Apprendi–Booker line of cases to determine just how advisory the
Guidelines are under Supreme Court precedent.  Much of the analysis is
devoted to the Court’s 2013 decision in Peugh v. United States.40  The
discussion focuses on whether Peugh represents a view of the Guidelines
32 Infra Appendix.
33 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4.
34 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000).
35 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(b); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
36 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2(d); McLoughlin, supra note 18, at R
89.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir. 2008).
38 Id.
39 Transcript of Disposition at 69, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D.
Mass. 2012).
40 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).
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as considerably more than advisory to the point that it is in serious ten-
sion with Booker.
Part II analyzes the terrorism enhancement.  The analysis focuses on
both the difficulties presented in applying this section of the Guidelines
and on the constitutional and other objections that have been made to it.
Part III turns to the sharp tensions that have emerged between trial
and appellate courts in the application of the enhancement.  These ten-
sions extend across the spectrum of the Guidelines’ application in the
post-Booker world of sentencing, but they are particularly acute in the
context of applying the enhancement.  Many trial judges liberally apply
the sentencing discretion that they possess now that the Guidelines are
not mandatory.41  Many appellate courts express the need to control this
discretion and to advance the policies embodied in the enhancement.42
Part IV first considers whether the enhancement makes a difference.
It examines briefly prosecutions under federal statutes forbidding the
provision of “material support” to terrorists and terrorist organizations.43
These statutes are the foundation for an essentially preventive form of
prosecution,44 a phenomenon that is likely to play an increasingly impor-
tant role in any domestic war on terror.  They are also the principal ex-
ample of cases where application of the enhancement may seem too
harsh.45  This Part then builds on the above analysis to grapple with a
major question posed by this Article: How should courts approach the
enhancement in cases where it makes a real difference?
I offer a tentative conclusion that the enhancement should not be
lightly disregarded.  It represents the will of Congress on how to deal
with a major societal problem.  Its imperfections, although not of a con-
stitutional dimension, present a problem.  It is up to the courts, primarily
trial courts, to deal with this problem.  Their approach should be to apply
it on a case-by-case basis—as part of the § 3553(a) inquiry—rather than
to accept it without question or reject it out of hand.  Still, the enhance-
ment may benefit from a presumption of validity beyond that afforded
other guidelines.  The result of this presumption would be that appellate
courts would need to review terrorism sentences more sharply than the
post-Booker doctrine seems to allow.  However, it is clear from recent
Supreme Court decisions on diverse matters, such as standing, pleading,
41 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 144–48 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing
district court sentence of twenty-eight months in a case where the Guideline range was sixty
months).
42 See, e.g., id. at 147–53 (remanding the case for resentencing).
43 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B (2012).
44 See generally Chesney, supra note 15. R
45 Transcript of Disposition at 69, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D.
Mass. 2012).
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and freedom of speech, that a special approach to terrorism may apply in
some instances.46  The enhancement issue is one of those instances.
I. THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW
A. The Guidelines and the Judge
As Professors Abrams, Beale, and Klein state, “It is no exaggeration
to say that federal sentencing was revolutionized by the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984, which created the current Guidelines system.”47  The
hallmarks of the previous sentencing practice were broad judicial discre-
tion, within broad statutory sentencing ranges, and no appellate review of
sentences.48  The Guidelines sought to cabin that discretion by establish-
ing base levels for different offenses and by directing how judges should
exercise discretion over a range of possible sentencing factors.  This lat-
ter aspect of the Guidelines came in only after the basic verdict, plea, or
finding of guilty, and the establishment of the resulting base level.
Under the Guidelines, a judge, at this early stage, had to make find-
ings concerning specific offense characteristics, such as the possession of
a firearm,49 and generic adjustments, such as the presence of a vulnerable
victim.50  These, and other, findings were to be made by application of a
preponderance of the evidence standard and resulted in automatic up-
ward or downward adjustments to the sentence.  The Guidelines did not
seek to alter the role of the judge vis-a`-vis that of the jury.  The principal
goal of the Guidelines was to eliminate disparities among the sentences
by limiting judicial discretion.51  Under both the Guidelines and pre-ex-
isting law, the judge still played a dominant role in the sentencing phase
of a criminal case.  In what might seem at first like a paradoxical devel-
opment, the judge’s reduced discretion became a basis for an ultimately
successful constitutional challenge to the Guidelines based on the defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury finding of facts.
B. From Apprendi to Booker: The Constitutional Showdown over the
Guidelines
Constitutional issues have plagued the Guidelines.  They took effect
in 1987.  In 1989, the Supreme Court quickly dispatched a challenge,
based on separation of powers, to the composition and authority of the
46 See Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013); Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
47 ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 2, at 967. R
48 Id.
49 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.6 (2013).
50 Id. § 3A1.1(b).
51 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989).
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United States Sentencing Commission.52  However, the requirement that
the judge find facts that would affect the length of sentence ran into Sixth
Amendment issues that had long divided the Supreme Court.53  In its 5–4
2000 decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey,54 the majority held that
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”55  In partic-
ular, the majority expressed reservations about the notion of “sentencing
factors”: facts “not found by a jury but that could affect the sentence
imposed by the judge.”56  As Apprendi came from a state system and did
not involve sentencing guidelines, the first shoe dropped when the major-
ity used similar reasoning to invalidate a system of state guidelines in
Blakely v. Washington.57 Booker58 was the second shoe.
The paradox referred to above is that, under a pre-guidelines sys-
tem, the judge possessed a very broad range of discretion in imposing a
sentence.  How, then, could a defendant’s rights be diminished by legis-
lative or administrative actions that limit that discretion and set forth
guideposts that judges have to respect?  The answer appears to be that
guidelines systems prescribe a range of punishments that must be im-
posed if the defendant commits X conduct.  The defendant, on the other
hand, has a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the facts
that would constitute X.59  In a discretionary system, on the other hand,
society may not have prescribed such consequences at all for “sentencing
factors.”  These facts are in the judge’s domain, if even found, and the
defendant has no correlative right to a jury determination of them.  This
argument, even though rooted in history, may strike some as thin.  Even
thinner, perhaps, is the notion that “advisory guidelines” constitute much
more than a return to the old discretionary system.
C. Booker and the Shift of the Guidelines from Mandatory to
Advisory
Booker is an extremely complex case that grew out of a routine drug
prosecution.60  The jury convicted a defendant of possession “based on
evidence that he had 92.5 grams of [cocaine base] in his duffel bag.”61
52 Id.
53 E.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
54 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468 (2000).
55 Id. at 490.
56 Id. at 487.
57 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
58 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
59 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475–76.
60 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–28 (outlining facts).
61 Id. at 235.
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However, at a post-trial sentencing hearing a judge found, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, two key facts: that the defendant possessed an
additional 566 grams of the drug, and that he “was guilty of obstructing
justice.”62  Under the (then-mandatory) Guidelines, these facts pushed
the defendant’s sentencing range upward to the point where he might
have faced life imprisonment.  The judge ultimately imposed a sentence
that was almost ten years longer than he would have imposed based on
the jury’s verdict and the defendant’s criminal history.63
In the Supreme Court, Booker produced an array of opinions, in-
cluding two majorities: one invalidating the Guidelines-based sentence
and one prescribing a future role for the Guidelines themselves.  I will
follow the practice of Professors Abrams, Beale, and Klein in referring to
these two opinions as the “merits majority” and the “remedial
majority.”64
For the merits majority, the case presented a straightforward exam-
ple of the problem faced in Apprendi and Blakely.  The judge had “im-
pose[d] a sentence that [was] not solely based on ‘facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’”65  This violated what the
merits majority saw as a defendant’s Sixth Amendment protection
“against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”66
For this majority, what the Guidelines viewed as sentencing factors that
could be decided by a judge under the preponderance standard were, in
effect, “elements of the crime with which he is charged.”67  In dissent,
Justice Breyer cited the longstanding tradition of “post-conviction judge-
run sentencing procedures.”68  Justice Breyer did not prevail on the mer-
its.  However, he was in the remedial majority and wrote its opinion in a
way that preserved a significant role for the Guidelines while reinforcing
the judicial discretion in sentencing they had been meant to curtail.
The merits holding, that the mandatory Guidelines created an un-
constitutional judicial role in sentencing, posed serious remedial ques-
tions for the continued operation of the Guidelines system.  One of the
pillars of that system was the notion that judges would continue to exer-
cise their traditional authority, subject to a carefully crafted set of con-
straints.  If the constraints could not be mandatory, what role—if any—
would they play?  One option would be to shift the role of determining
62 Id. at 227.
63 See id. at 235.
64 See ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 2, at 982–85. R
65 Booker, 543 U.S. at 232.
66 Id. at 230.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 328 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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sentencing facts to the jury.69  If such facts were actually elements of the
crime, such a shift would make constitutional sense.  However, the reme-
dial majority saw this approach as unworkable and unnecessary.70  In-
stead, the majority solved the problem posed by the mandatory
Guidelines by making them advisory.71  As Justice Breyer put it, by re-
moving the provision of the sentencing statute “that makes the relevant
sentencing rules . . . mandatory and impose[s] binding requirements on
all sentencing judges’—the statute falls outside of Apprendi’s
requirement.”72
Congress’s actions in the sentencing area made it clear that the leg-
islative body assumed that judges would play a dominant role in sentenc-
ing.73  The Guidelines could be made advisory by excising discrete
portions of existing statutes.74  The language that was removed had made
the Guidelines generally binding on trial judges75 and had required de
novo review at the appellate level of “departures from the applicable
Guidelines range.”76
Appellate review of sentences was preserved, although the general
standard would be one of reasonableness.77  More importantly, the reme-
dial opinion envisaged a continued important role for the Guidelines at
the trial level.  Even after the excision, the general federal sentencing
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),78 still “requires judges to take account of
the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.”79  Moreover, Jus-
tice Breyer suggested that these goals were themselves consistent with
the Guidelines.80
Justice Breyer seemed to have squared the circle.81  The constitu-
tional objection to the Guidelines was removed, but they remained in
place.  Their status was now advisory, but judges had to consider them.
Appellate review was still available, and a general reasonableness stan-
dard might conceivably stretch to the Guidelines’ role in a particular sen-
tence.  Trial judges were clear winners, but neither the Guidelines nor the
courts of appeals were clear losers.
69 See id. at 284–86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 245 (majority opinion).
72 Id. at 259.
73 See id. at 245–47.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 259.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 262.
78 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
79 Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
80 See id. at 264–65.
81 See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1492 (2008) (noting that Booker transformed the Guidelines
from “law ‘to a lesser species, a form of quasi-law’”).
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D. The Post-Booker Trilogy–Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough
Justice Breyer’s tour de force led to an obvious contradiction.  As
the Supreme Court began the difficult task of fleshing out Booker, Justice
Souter stated his concern in Rita v. United States:
If district judges treated the now-discretionary Guide-
lines simply as worthy of consideration but open to re-
jection in any given case, the Booker remedy would
threaten a return to the old sentencing regime and would
presumably produce the apparent disuniformity that con-
vinced Congress to adopt Guideline sentencing in the
first place.  But if sentencing judges attributed substan-
tial gravitational pull to the now-discretionary Guide-
lines, if they treated the Guidelines result as persuasive
or presumptively appropriate, the Booker remedy would
in practical terms preserve the very feature of the Guide-
lines that threatened to trivialize the jury right.82
Rita was the first of three cases that followed shortly after the enig-
matic Booker decision.  In Rita, the trial judge imposed a Guidelines sen-
tence, which the Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal.  The Fourth Circuit
stated that a properly calculated Guidelines sentence is “presumptively
reasonable”83 and candidly noted that “most sentences will continue to
fall within the applicable guideline range.”84
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court emphasized that it was recog-
nizing an appellate court presumption.85  He stated that when a within-
Guidelines sentence reached the appellate court it reflected a “double
determination”: that of the judge who had heard the case and that of the
Sentencing Commission that had articulated the appropriate punish-
ment.86  The key to his analysis is the role of the general sentencing
objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).87  They include consideration
of such factors as offense and offender characteristics;88 the need for the
sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment;”89 and the Guidelines them-
selves.90  These objectives would have been determinative not only for
82 551 U.S. 338, 390 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 345–46 (majority opinion).
84 Id. at 346.
85 Id. at 353–54.
86 Id. at 347.
87 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
88 Id. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A).
89 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
90 Id. § 3553(a)(4).
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the trial judge, but also for the Commission when it wrote the
Guidelines.91
There may be some tension between this normative description of
the Guidelines and Justice Breyer’s description, immediately following,
of the Commission’s empirical approach to sentencing.92  The important
point, however, is that Justice Breyer built upon his suggestion in Booker
that the § 3553(a) factors and the Guidelines are in harmony.  This point
dilutes the impact of any reading of Booker that viewed the case as a
rejection of the Guidelines in favor of the statutory factors.  It is hard to
see a rejection if the two are essentially the same.
There were, of course, the expected qualifications.  The trial judge
need not apply the Guidelines.93  Appellate courts are not bound to apply
the presumption of reasonableness.94  However, Rita made it clear that
appellate review is not unbounded.  Justice Breyer stated that appellate
courts “exist to correct . . . mistakes when they occur.”95  He suggested
approval of the approach of some circuit courts that “the strength of the
justification needed to sustain an outside-Guidelines sentence varies in
proportion to the degree of the variance.”96
In sum, Rita contains something for everyone, in large part because
all three courts were in agreement on the validity of the Guidelines’ ap-
plication in a particular case.  One might offer the somewhat incongruous
conclusion that it strengthened the Guidelines by further tying them to
§ 3553(a) and affirming the presumption of validity, strengthened the
role of the trial judge by re-affirming Booker’s treatment of the Guide-
lines as advisory, and—at the least—preserved the role of appellate
courts.  To the extent that Booker invites disharmony, Rita may not pro-
vide many answers.
Disharmony was very much present in Gall v. United States,97 a
Supreme Court decision that focused primarily on the role of appellate
courts in an advisory Guidelines system. Gall was a routine drug case in
which the trial judge imposed a probation-only sentence that was outside
the Guidelines.98  The Eighth Circuit reversed the sentence, holding that
a sentence outside the Guidelines range must be supported by a justifica-
tion that is “proportional to the extent of the difference between the advi-
91 Rita, 551 U.S. at 348 (“Congressional statutes . . . tell the Commission to write Guide-
lines that will carry out these same § 3553(a) objectives.”).
92 Id. at 349–50.
93 Id. at 350.
94 Id. at 350–52.
95 Id. at 354.
96 Id. at 355.
97 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
98 Id. at 43–45 (describing lower court proceedings).
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sory range and the sentence imposed.”99  The Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals and reinstated the sentence.
The Court’s opinion is not a model of clarity.  It noted that creating
a presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines
would come close to making them mandatory, in violation of Booker.100
It cautioned courts of appeals to review all sentences “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.”101  Thus, any standard of direct propor-
tionality would be invalid.102  The Court explicitly rejected “applying a
heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines
range.”103  At the same time, it said that appellate courts can take into
account the degree of variance and deviation from the Guidelines, reaf-
firming the approach suggested in Rita.104
The Court’s instructions for trial judges were considerably clearer.
The district judge must give serious consideration to and explain any
deviation from the Guidelines.  Indeed, “a district court should begin all
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guide-
lines range.”105  Furthermore, “a major departure should be supported by
a more significant justification than a minor one.”106 Gall is perhaps best
known for setting out the sequence the trial judge must follow: correctly
calculate the applicable Guidelines range; hear arguments from the par-
ties; consider the § 3553(a) factors; and, explain his or her reasoning.107
The appellate court reviews these actions by first considering whether
proper procedures were followed, and then reviews the substantive rea-
sonableness of the sentence.108
Gall looks like a win for trial judges and a slap on the wrist of
appellate courts.  As long as the former follow the proper steps—some
would say go through the motions—their decisions are relatively insu-
lated.  Appellate review still has a role to play, albeit an uncertain one,
particularly if appellate judges can find wiggle-room in the concept of
“procedural error.”  As for the Guidelines, they remain important.  The
trial judge must begin the sentencing process with them and the appellate
court has some ability to consider the extent of deviation.  Once again,
the system appears to be in a considerable state of flux.
99 Id. at 45.
100 Id. at 47 (“[Warning against] creating an impermissible unreasonableness presumption
for sentences outside the Guidelines range.”).
101 Id. at 41.
102 Id. at 47 (rejecting “the use of a rigid mathematical formula . . . .”).
103 Id. at 49.
104 Id. at 51 (stating review of sentences may include the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range); but see id. at 59 (cautioning against de novo review).
105 Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
106 Id. at 50.
107 Id. at 49–50.
108 Id. at 50.
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Kimbrough v. United States109 presented, in even sharper form, the
post-Booker tensions between trial courts, appellate courts, the Guide-
lines, and the general § 3553(a) standards.  In a case involving, in part,
drug offenses, the trial judge declined to apply a guideline that reflected
Congress’s treatment of crack cocaine far more seriously than powder
cocaine.110  He expressed disagreement with the guideline itself and with
the “disproportionate and unjust effect” of the differential treatment.  The
court of appeals reversed on the ground that an outside-Guidelines sen-
tence would be “per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement
with the sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses.”111
The Supreme Court reversed that decision, in part on the noncontrover-
sial ground that, post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory and sentencing
is controlled by the general § 3553(a) standards.  As noted, these include
such general goals as the need to “promote respect for the law” and to
“provide just punishment for the offense.”112  There seemed to be gen-
eral agreement that a court’s authority under an advisory Guidelines sys-
tem includes authority to reject application of a guideline based on policy
differences.113
The problem with disapproval here was that the guidelines were
originally based on legislation reflecting the same different treatment of
the two substances.114  The Sentencing Commission had since changed
its mind on the subject, but Congress had rejected a proposed change in
the Guidelines.115  The Court had essentially two responses, beyond the
advisory nature of any guideline.  First, it contended that Congress
“knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms,”116 and had
not done so in this context.  Second, the Court stressed the continuing
role of the Guidelines and their rough congruence with § 3553(a).117
However, the Court took the extraordinary step of declaring some Guide-
lines more worthy of respect than others.118  The Sentencing Commis-
sion’s institutional strengths come from its extensive work with
“empirical data and national experience.”119  By implication, its role
does not extend to policy determinations.  Thus a trial judge could utilize
a policy-based disagreement with a Guideline, ostensibly on the general
109 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
110 Id. at 91–93 (describing lower court proceedings).
111 Id. at 93.
112 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012).
113 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101–02.
114 See id. at 94–97.
115 Id. at 99.
116 Id. at 103.
117 Id. at 108–09.
118 See id. at 109–10.
119 Id. at 109 (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring)).
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ground that it would violate the sentencing statute by yielding sentences
“greater than necessary” to achieve the § 3553(a) purposes.
It is hard to assess the bearing of Kimbrough.  On the one hand, the
Court emphasized the freedom of trial judges to depart from the Guide-
lines in any given case.  By implication, this freedom would lead to a
limited appellate role.  But the core analysis rests on the premise that
some guidelines (at least this one) deserve less respect than others.
Taken together, the three cases send uncertain messages that might be
summarized as follows: The Guidelines maintain an important role.  In-
deed, a trial judge can simply follow them as long as he or she also
follows the Gall sequence.  On the other hand, the judge can depart as
long as the proper sequence is followed.  Matching the sentence to the
language of § 3553(a) is key.  As long as that is done, appellate review,
while still available, will be an uphill process.
E. Peugh
All of this makes the status of the “advisory” Guidelines less than
clear, and the Court’s recent 5–4 decision in Peugh v. United States120
compounds the problem by pushing the Guidelines closer to the status of
“law.”  Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor described the Guide-
lines as “the lodestone” of sentencing.121  For the dissenters, Justice
Thomas saw them as “flexible ‘guideposts’ which inform the district
courts’ discretion.”122 Both cannot be right. Peugh advances the view
that the Guidelines are very close to “law,” and will serve to enhance
their already considerable role.
The issue in Peugh was whether to apply the Guidelines in effect
when a convicted defendant’s conduct occurred or those in effect when
he was sentenced.  The latter approach, followed by the trial court, re-
sulted in a substantially higher sentence.123  The defendant appealed, in-
voking the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.124
The government advanced the straightforward argument that, be-
cause the Guidelines are advisory rather than legally binding, there could
not be an ex post facto problem.125  The majority applied the following
test: “[W]hether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of in-
creasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’”126
Justice Sotomayor answered the question in the affirmative, rejecting the
120 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013).
121 Id. at 2085.
122 Id. at 2091 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 2078–79 (majority opinion).
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
125 Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085.
126 Id. at 2082.
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government’s argument.  In doing so, she drew not only on the remedial
holding of Booker, but also on every pro-Guidelines theme of the post-
Booker trilogy.
She described the post-Booker sentencing scheme as one that “aims
to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored
by the Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through
the process of appellate review.”127  She noted, for example, that trial
courts must begin their analysis with a correct Guidelines calculation.
Appellate review uses the Guidelines as a benchmark.128  Courts of ap-
peals may presume a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable129 and
may consider the extent of any deviation as part of their reasonableness
review.130  In sum, “the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the
sentence.”131  Not surprisingly, empirical evidence buttressed this theo-
retical analysis and demonstrated that the Guidelines have a significant
effect on sentencing.132  The dissenters invoked the Booker merits opin-
ion and the Court’s many references to the Guidelines’ advisory sta-
tus,133 but the pendulum appeared to have swung.
Of course, it cannot swing much further without calling Booker it-
self into question.  On the analytical level, one might conclude that the
present uncertainty can only be resolved by a return to Booker and, in
particular, a revision of the remedy.  If the constitutional problem is judi-
cial finding of sentencing facts, then—in the case of trials—juries should
find them.  One of the ironies of the post-Booker cases is that there is
almost no mention of the jury’s role at all.  The trial judge remains the
principal sentencing actor, and the Guidelines—especially if closely
tethered to § 3553(a)—are the judge’s principal tool.  Appellate courts
may derive some support from the language of Peugh, and the notion
that they have a duty to police guideline compliance.  However, a trial
judge who handles Guidelines questions in the proper sequence134 is still
in a strong position. Peugh can be read to weaken this position in a case
of disagreement with a Guideline, but the fundamental dynamic remains
in place. Peugh marks a shift in emphasis in the four-way relationship
among the judge, the appellate court, the Guidelines, and § 3553(a).




131 Id.  But see Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (reaffirming Apprendi
and holding that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum sentence is an “element” of the
crime, not a “sentencing factor,” and that such facts must be submitted to the jury).
132 Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (citing, inter alia, Sentencing Commission data).
133 See, e.g., id. at 2089–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007) (laying out sequence for trial
judges to follow).
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Still, without revisiting Booker, the balance of power is unlikely to
change substantially.
It is against this background that the operation of the terrorism en-
hancement plays out.  As noted, it is part of the Guidelines.  It is fertile
ground for disagreement between trial and appellate courts.  The next
section examines the enhancement and the controversies it has engen-
dered.  This inquiry leads to the important issue of whether enhancement
questions are somehow different from those posed by other guidelines.
II. THE TERRORISM ENHANCEMENT AND ITS PROBLEMS
A. Initial Questions
The Sentencing Commission promulgated and then amended135 the
enhancement as § 3A1.4 of the Guidelines.  It is open to criticism on
several grounds.  If applied in every case— something that should not
happen in a system of advisory Guidelines—it would amount to a
mandatory minimum sentence for a wide range of terrorism offenses.
The combination of a high base offense level and the highest criminal
history score ensure this result.  The latter aspect can be totally artificial
if a defendant has not committed any prior crimes.  The enhancement
does not itself refer to specific offenses.  Instead, it refers to a “federal
crime of terrorism,”136 defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).137 That stat-
ute lists over fifty crimes and requires that a qualifying offense be “cal-
culated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation
or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”138
The intent or “motivational”139 character of this definition can lead
to problems.  The enhancement applies “[i]f the offense is a felony that
involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.”140  It
is thus necessary to untangle this first predicate before one grapples with
the “calculated” issue.  It makes sense to read “or” as indicating that the
defendant may either have committed (through his involvement) a crime
of terrorism or “intended to promote” one.  If the first predicate is met,
the defendant’s conduct would have to satisfy a second intent require-
ment: the “calculated” portion of the federal crime definition.  Defend-
ants have insisted that “calculated” requires proof of motive.141
However, the courts have read it as synonymous with intent.  It is not
135 See McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 51. R
136 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2013).
137 Id. § 3A1.4, cmt. n.1.
138 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2012).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 312 (2d Cir. 2010).
140 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4.
141 See, e.g., Awan, 607 F.3d at 315; United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 136–37 (2d
Cir. 2009); United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1247–48 (11th Cir. 2004).
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hard to conclude that the intentional commission of the crimes listed in
§ 2332b(g)(5)—such as conspiracy to murder, kidnap, or maim
abroad142 and hostage taking143—can usually be tied to government con-
duct in some way.  Indeed, the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Awan,144 appears to have merged the two “intent” requirements145 and
eliminated any motivational aspect of “calculated.”146
The issue of intent gets a little harder if a defendant’s offense of
conviction is not a federal crime of terror at all, but is “intended to pro-
mote” one.  We are now dealing with three apparent intent requirements:
the intent to commit the crime of conviction; the intent to promote a
further crime; and the “calculated” element of that second crime.  It
makes sense to read intention to promote more broadly than involve-
ment,147 even though the result can be application of the terrorism en-
hancement to conduct that is not a federal crime of terror.148  One might
conclude that the calculated requirement is satisfied by the future intent
of others—whose future crime has already been imputed to the defen-
dant—or one can say that by intending to promote the future crime
which would affect government conduct, the defendant simultaneously
intended that effect.  Either way, the terrorism enhancement casts a
“broad net.”149
B. Constitutional Questions
Although Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory in order to pre-
vent them from being found unconstitutional, the argument is sometimes
raised that the enhancement is vulnerable to constitutional challenge.150
Many courts give these arguments short shrift,151 but two arguments
merit consideration.
The first possible critique is that the enhancement has become, in
effect, mandatory, because appellate courts tend to treat it as the norm in
all terrorism cases.  In United States v. Jayyousi,152 a majority of the
142 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2012).
143 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2012).
144 607 F.3d 306.
145 See id. at 316.
146 Id. at 317.
147 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, No. 12-14585, 2013 WL 2450741, at *3 (11th Cir.
June 4, 2013).
148 See, e.g., United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 825–26 (7th Cir. 2009); Awan, 607
F.3d at 314.
149 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
150 E.g., McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 83. R
151 United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1117 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Abu
Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir. 2008); Ashqar, 582 F.3d at 824 (“We have rejected variants of
this argument countless times, and we do so again here.”).
152 657 F.3d 1085.
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Eleventh Circuit vacated a sentence that had been reduced by the trial
judge after initially calculating a sentence that included the enhance-
ment.153  Although the majority noted that the trial judge had not treated
the Guidelines as mandatory,154 Judge Barkett argued in dissent that the
appeals court had done just that.155  Her argument suggests that a wide-
spread appellate practice of automatically insisting on the enhancement’s
dominance in any sentence would violate Booker.  However, the Jayy-
ousi court did not specifically rely on the enhancement in its vacation of
the sentence.156  Instead, it criticized the district judge’s application of
§ 3553(a) to that terrorist defendant and to terrorists generally.157  Appel-
late courts that agree with the enhancement and the reasoning behind
it158 may exhibit some variation in reviewing terrorists’ sentences.159
Although close to the line, it is probably not unconstitutional for the en-
hancement to occupy the somewhat paradoxical position of a binding
advisory guideline.
A second set of critiques, exemplified by the excellent study by
James McLoughlin,160 also draws on Booker.  It emphasizes the status of
the enhancement, a guideline for sentencing, as almost creating a sepa-
rate offense.  One variation is what has been referred to as “the tail wag-
ging the dog” perspective.161  Under this view, the enhancement, because
of its substantial penalties, becomes more important than the offense of
conviction.  As McLoughlin suggests, the government can get a large
sentence by having the jury convict the defendant of an easy-to-prove
offense, and then having the judge increase the sentence through the en-
hancement that he or she finds applicable through a preponderance of the
evidence standard.162  This argument has force, but is hampered by the
fact that the judge can vary downward, or—in theory—not apply the
enhancement at all, as long as the ultimate sentence is sufficiently
anchored in § 3553(a) to survive appellate review.
A variant of the second critique focuses on the role of the judge in
finding intent in applying the enhancement.  Intent is an important ele-
ment of most crimes.  McLoughlin goes so far as to state that “[a]fter
153 Id. at 1117–19.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1130–31 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
156 See generally id. (majority opinion) (failing to explicitly invoke the enhancement).
157 Id. at 1117–19.
158 See United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Here, the district
court made extensive factual findings and the terrorism enhancement is doing just what it
ought to do: Punishing more harshly than other criminals those whose wrongs served an end
more terrible than other crimes.”).
159 E.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 571 (5th Cir. 2011).
160 McLoughlin, supra note 18. R
161 United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 354 (4th Cir. 2004).
162 McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 80. R
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Booker and after Blakely, there is a serious argument that unless a jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had the intent required
to apply Sentencing Guideline 3A1.4, there is a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Trial by Jury Clause of the
Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Apprendi.”163  As discussed earlier,
there may be a question whether a particular defendant’s intent to com-
mit the offense of conviction can be stretched to cover both an “intention
to promote a federal crime of terror,” and the “calculated” element of any
such later crimes.164  Courts have not been reluctant to make that stretch,
particularly when known terrorist organizations are in the picture.  As the
Fifth Circuit put it in United States v. El-Mezain,165 “[t]o the extent that
the defendants knowingly assisted Hamas, their actions benefitted
Hamas’s terrorist goals and were calculated to promote a terrorist crime
that influenced government.”166  In sum, the constitutional critique is
useful in suggesting outer boundaries for the enhancement.  Given
Booker and the advisory nature of the Guidelines, however, it does not
seem likely to prevail.
C. Policy Disagreements: Are Some Guidelines More Equal than
Others?
The enhancement may well survive constitutional critiques.  Its
complicated structure and workability present problems, but courts seem
able to resolve them.  Yet, there remains the fundamental question of
whether the enhancement is inherently flawed, as well as the related
question of whether courts might be freer to give it little weight as com-
pared to the usual deference shown to other Guidelines and the Sentenc-
ing Commission.
The latter question has its origins in Kimbrough.167  That case in-
volved the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines for crack cocaine, which
were based on Congress’s sharply differential treatment of powder and
crack cocaine.168  The trial judge refused to apply the guidelines and ex-
pressed disagreement with the policy underlying them.169  The Supreme
Court approved this approach.  It stated that the guidelines governing
crack cocaine “do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its char-
acteristic institutional role.  In formulating Guidelines ranges for crack
cocaine offenses . . . the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum
163 Id. at 83.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 139–149. R
165 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011).
166 Id. at 571.
167 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 85 (2007).
168 Id. at 91–93 (discussing facts).
169 The judge saw the case as exemplifying the “disproportionate and unjust effect that
crack cocaine guidelines have in sentencing.” Id. at 93.
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sentences set [by Congress], and did not take account of ‘empirical data
and national experience.’”170
In other words, the Guidelines’ prominent place in sentencing deci-
sions flows from the expertise of the Commission and its ongoing empir-
ical review of sentencing practices.  The Commission is not a policy-
making body.  The Supreme Court re-emphasized this difference two
years after Kimbrough in Spears v. United States,171 another crack co-
caine case: “The only fact necessary to justify a [crack sentencing] vari-
ance is the sentencing court’s disagreement with the guidelines—its
policy view that the 100-to-1 ratio creates an unwarranted disparity.”172
Professors Abrams, Beale, and Klein note that “a handful of opinions
declining to sentence within a Guideline characterized that Guideline as a
response to a congressional directive, rather a product of the Commis-
sion’s normal process.”173  Indeed, they note that “[t]here is an increas-
ing consensus that some Guidelines—most notably the crack
Guideline—are deeply flawed and concerns have been raised about other
Guidelines as well.”174
Not surprisingly, this critique has been extended to the terrorism
enhancement.  As John McLoughlin notes, there was not much empirical
data on terrorism sentences when the Sentencing Commission promul-
gated it.175  More importantly, the Commission acted in response to di-
rectives from Congress.176  In 2012, a defendant sentenced under the
enhancement argued that “the terrorism enhancement, like the child por-
nography Guidelines, is not entitled to the respect or deference of a sen-
tencing judge because the enhancement was not the product of empirical
‘research.’”177  The Second Circuit, which had accepted such an argu-
ment in the child pornography context,178 called it “unavailing”179 but
stated that a district court retains its freedom to disagree “with the weight
the Guidelines assign to a factor.”180
The argument that the terrorism enhancement deserves less weight
because Congress directed its promulgation seems counterintuitive.
Congress sets basic sentencing policy through the penalties it attaches to
the crimes it creates.  Perhaps the strongest statement of this position is
Judge Walker’s concurring opinion in another Second Circuit terrorism
170 Id. at 89.
171 555 U.S. 261 (2009).
172 Id. at 264.
173 ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 2, at 1001. R
174 Id. at 1030.
175 McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 115. R
176 Id. at 51.
177 United States v. Salim, 690 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir. 2012).
178 United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010).
179 Salim, 690 F.3d at 126.
180 Id.
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case: United States v. Stewart.181  He began by noting Congress’s desire
to “ensure that crimes of terrorism were met with a punishment that re-
flects their extraordinary seriousness.”182  The enhancement reflects
Congress’s and the Sentencing Commission’s policy judgment that “an
act of terrorism represents a particularly grave threat because of the dan-
gerousness of the crime and the difficulty of deterring and rehabilitating
the criminal, and thus that terrorists and their supporters should be inca-
pacitated for a longer period of time.”183  He repeatedly referred to the
enhancement as a “signal” of Congress’s will.184
Apart from the suggestion that the Commission plays a policymak-
ing role akin to Congress’s, Judge Walker’s argument has considerable
force.  It is buttressed by the fact that in Kimbrough itself, the Supreme
Court stated that “Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sen-
tencing practices in express terms.”185  The Court’s language clearly sug-
gests that a guideline adopted pursuant to such “express terms” would
merit greater respect than one that simply reflected the policies of an
underlying penalty scheme.186  The Commission’s acting to carry out
such a directive would seem consistent with Mistretta v. United States.187
In that case, the Supreme Court, in upholding the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s creation against a separation of powers challenge, analogized the
Commission to an administrative agency and noted that Congress had
given it several explicit directives.188  In sum, the “policy disagreement”
argument against the enhancement is not convincing.  One must recog-
nize, however, that it is part of the dialogue about the enhancement and
that district judges who share this objection to the enhancement’s status,
or who don’t like its content, can find a way to incorporate policy con-
cerns into their § 3553(a) analysis of individual sentences.  After all, the
Guidelines, no matter how worthy of respect, are still advisory.
As for the view that the enhancement is inherently flawed, three
critiques are worthy of note.  The first is the assignment of a criminal
history score of VI—the highest possible score—to defendants who may
be first-time offenders.  At the sentencing proceeding in United States v.
Mehanna, the trial judge summed up this critique as follows:
181 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 163 (2d Cir. 2009) (Walker, J., concurring).
182 Id. at 172.
183 Id. at 172–73.  It is not clear that Judge Walker is correct in treating the Commission’s
role in formulating the enhancement as an example of policy-making on its part.  After all, the
basic policy came from Congress.
184 Id. at 173–74 (referring three times to the enhancement as a “signal”).
185 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 87 (2007).
186 The Guideline at issue in Kimbrough was derived initially from the penalty scheme for
cocaine offenses. See generally id. at 94–97.
187 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
188 Id. at 388–90.
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[T]he automatic assignment of a defendant to a Criminal
History Category VI is not only too blunt an instrument
to have genuine analytical value, it is fundamentally at
odds with the design of the Guidelines.  It can, as it does
in this case, import a fiction into the calculus.  It would
impute to a defendant who has had no criminal history a
fictional history of the highest level of seriousness.  It’s
one thing to adjust the offense level upward to signify
the seriousness of the offense.  It is entirely another to
say that defendant has a history of criminal activity that
he does not, in fact, have.189
Justification for the criminal history score rests on more than the
fact that it does “just what it ought to do”190 by helping increase the
sentences of criminals who deserve harsh punishment.  The contention is
that the high criminal history score is a proxy for the propensity of ter-
rorists to commit more crimes if not punished harshly.  The Guidelines
count criminal history precisely to factor this propensity into the sen-
tence.191  As the Second Circuit put it in an influential opinion, terrorists,
even those with no prior criminal record, “are unique among criminals in
the likelihood of recidivism, the difficulty of rehabilitation, and the need
for incapacitation.”192
A second substantive critique is that the enhancement does not take
into account the extent of harm caused by the defendant.  Judge Cala-
bresi has cautioned that society gives consequences “considerable weight
when we mete out punishment and blame.”193  The enhancement cuts the
other way, taking a per se mandatory minimum approach to any success-
ful conviction (or guilty plea) for a federal crime of terrorism.  As dis-
cussed below, some of these crimes are inchoate steps along the way to
acts of terrorism: a central goal of counter-terrorism law is to prevent
such acts before they happen.194  Thus the absence of harm should not
prevent appropriate punishment.  The Fourth Circuit has cautioned
189 Transcript of Disposition at 69, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D.
Mass. 2012); see McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 113–17. R
190 United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008).
191 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2013) (“To
protect the public from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism
and future criminal behavior must be considered.”).
192 United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003). But see McLoughlin, supra
note 18, at 113–17 (criticizing criminal history score as contrary to sentencing policy, and not R
based on empirical evidence); see also TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREATMENT, THE CONSTITU-
TION PROJECT, REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK FORCE ON DETAINEE TREAT-
MENT 295–310 (2013) (discussing controversy over recidivism by former Guantanamo
detainees).
193 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 155 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
194 See infra notes 256–261 and accompanying text. R
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against “wait[ing] until there are victims of terrorist attacks to fully en-
force the nation’s criminal laws against terrorism.”195
Both of these critiques raise a more fundamental question: Is terror-
ism sufficiently unique (and dangerous) that it justifies a sentencing
“rule” that goes against notions of individualized sentences that reflect
the inevitable differentiation among criminals?  Judge Calabresi noted
that a single federal crime of terrorism—the provision of material sup-
port196—covers many different forms of conduct.197  He concluded that
“unusually broad sentencing discretion in the district court is essen-
tial.”198  Judge Walker replied that Congress wanted the Sentencing
Commission to do precisely what it did in the enhancement: reach the
broad range of crimes that support terrorism.199
The various critiques have considerable weight.  Still, how one
comes out on them will almost always reflect one’s position on the fun-
damental question of the validity of a per se approach.  There is a clear
tension between our decision as a society to treat most terrorism offenses
as part of the regular criminal justice system, on the one hand, and the
pull toward special rules to deal with them on the other.200  The enhance-
ment is an example of such a special rule.  The central, and unresolved,
question for trial judges at the sentencing phase of a terrorism trial is
whether to focus on the special approach, which the enhancement repre-
sents, or whether to treat the defendant like any other defendant, utilizing
the standards and factors of § 3553(a).201  Thus, the post-Booker debate
about the relationship between that statute and the Guidelines is of par-
ticular relevance.202  To some extent, judges will look to appellate courts
for answers.  The appellate opinions appear to tilt in favor of the en-
hancement and the approach it embodies.  However, the value of any
message that appellate courts might send is inevitably bound up with
broader questions about the sentencing relationship between trial and ap-
pellate courts in the post-Booker era.
195 United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 264 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing the district court).
196 Stewart, 590 F.3d at 154 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 176–79 (Walker, J., concurring).
200 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After
Abu Ali, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1501 (2010).  Vladeck notes several critiques based on this tension,
including “pressure on the courts to sanction exceptional departures from procedural or evi-
dentiary norms that will eventually become settled as the rule—what we might characterize as
either a ‘distortion effect’ or a ‘seepage problem.’” Id. at 1501.
201 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
202 See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Meskini,
319 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2003).
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III. TRIAL COURTS, APPELLATE COURTS, AND THE ROLE OF
THE ENHANCEMENT
It is important to remember that the enhancement is a guideline:
§ 3A1.4.  Therefore, its role should be the same as that of any other
guideline in sentencing decisions.  The standard approach to its applica-
tion is the sequence set out in Gall:203 calculating the applicable Guide-
lines range, hearing from the parties, consideration of the § 3553(a)
factors, and providing an explanation of the sentence chosen “to allow
for meaningful appellate review to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.”204
In a case involving a federal crime of terrorism, the enhancement is
applicable.  Thus, in calculating the Guidelines range, the trial judge
would have to rule on its applicability—particularly the difficult ques-
tions of whether the offense “involved, or was intended to promote, a
federal crime of terrorism”205—and whether the defendant exhibited the
mental state necessary to commit a “federal crime of terrorism.”206  If the
enhancement applies, the judge will thus begin with a substantial Guide-
lines range, apart from any other adjustments.207
The next important step is the more individualized inquiry called for
by § 3553(a).208  In performing this inquiry the judge is likely to be
heavily influenced by the Presentence Report (PSR) prepared by the
United States Probation Office.209  Although PSRs are not publicly avail-
able, court decisions suggest that they include the enhancement in terror-
ism cases.210  The judge thus approaches the § 3553(a) task with a
double tilt toward the enhancement.  Nonetheless, § 3553(a) calls for a
sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with [its
general] purposes . . . .”211  These purposes include specific inquiries.212
The first inquiry is “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.”213  The statute also directs
the judge to consider such factors as the need for the sentence to “reflect
the seriousness of the offense,”214 “provide just punishment,”215 “afford
203 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007).
204 Id.
205 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4(a) (2013).
206 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2012).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 24–30.
208 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
209 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
210 See, e.g., United States v. Kadir, 718 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[O]ffense level
exceeded by six levels the highest level on sentencing chart . . . .”).
211 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
212 See id. § 3553(a)(2).
213 Id. § 3553(a)(1).
214 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
215 Id.
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adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,”216 and “protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant.”217
In other words, § 3553(a) seemingly loosens the tight constraints
imposed by the Guidelines and permits the judge to engage in a poten-
tially highly individualized inquiry.  After Booker, that inquiry begins
with, and is to an uncertain degree guided by, the Guidelines—so to
speak.  The Guidelines range does not, however, constitute a presump-
tive sentence.218 Gall instructs the judge to:
[M]ake an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.  If he decided that an outside-Guidelines sen-
tence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the
deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently
compelling to support the degree of the variance.219
It is thus in the § 3553(a) application phase that the judge can es-
cape from the “draconian”220 application of the enhancement to the de-
fendant.  The judge might refuse to apply it on Kimbrough grounds, as
discussed above, if he or she thinks it does not merit the normal defer-
ence shown to the Guidelines.221  A more likely ground for refusal is
some particular mitigating aspect of the individual or case, which the
judge could emphasize in his or her application of § 3553(a).
Should such downward deviations from the Guidelines, especially if
substantial, be upheld on appeal? Booker and its progeny suggest an
affirmative answer, particularly if the judge provided a detailed explana-
tion.  Trying to figure out if this is the “correct” application of Booker
takes us deeply into the mysteries of that case and the doctrine it has
engendered.  Before Booker, appellate review of mandatory Guidelines
made sense.  Mandatory Guidelines had the status of law, and review of
their application was seen as necessary to promote uniformity.222  Re-
view of “advisory” law is a more difficult concept.  In Booker itself, the
remedial majority looked to a variety of sources—including appellate
practice and the “sound administration of justice”223—and implied from
them “a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts:
216 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
217 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
218 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).
219 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
220 McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 54. R
221 See supra text accompanying notes 167–188. R
222 See, e.g., ABRAMS, BEALE & KLEIN, supra note 2, at 985 (discussing appellate review R
after Booker).
223 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260–61 (2005) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)).
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review for ‘unreasonable[ness].’”224  This review was to be guided by
the § 3553(a) factors.225
Later cases elaborated on what the Court referred to as an “abuse-
of-discretion standard.”226 Gall set out the key steps of appellate review.
The first step is reviewing for procedural error, such as improper calcula-
tion of the Guidelines, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, and the
failure to explain the sentence “including an explanation for any devia-
tion from the Guidelines range.”227  After the procedural review, appel-
late courts should “consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”228  The
Court’s directives included the somewhat Delphic standard that appellate
courts could, but need not, apply a presumption of reasonableness to
within-Guidelines sentences, yet could not apply a presumption of unrea-
sonableness to outside-Guidelines sentences.229
All of this seems a bit unclear, beyond the fact that appellate courts
still have a role in reviewing sentences.  In the well-known case of
United States v. Cavera,230 for example, the judges of the Second Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, disagreed sharply on how carefully an appellate
court should scrutinize the trial judge’s disagreement with the Guide-
lines.231  How should an appellate court approach the question of a
judge’s application of the enhancement in a particular case?  One possi-
bility is that trial judges should apply it all the time and that appellate
courts should affirm all such decisions.  Sentencing decisions must begin
with a calculation of the Guidelines, of which the enhancement is a part.
If the enhancement was applied, the appellate court may presume that
was reasonable.  Yet, if the enhancement is automatically applied and
affirmed, it becomes the equivalent of treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, unconstitutional under Booker.  Perhaps one need not worry
about a convergence of this nature between the two levels.  The twin
facts of trial court discretion and some remaining appellate court power
suggest that a monolithic approach toward the enhancement is unlikely to
emerge.  Yet, the enhancement will continue to play a strong role in sen-
224 Id. at 261 (alteration in original).
225 See id. (“Those factors . . . will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in
determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.”).
226 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 362
(2007) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
227 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
228 Id.
229 Id. (stating that the appellate court “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must
give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify
the extent of the variance.”).
230 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008).
231 The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, but there were six separate opinions in
the case. E.g., id. at 197 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
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tencing decisions in terrorism cases and a strong tilt in its favor may well
be the result.
Examination of appellate cases decided since Booker suggests, in
fact, that such a tilt already exists.  When a district judge has applied the
enhancement, appellate courts have tended to affirm.232  Even if the sen-
tence included a partial downward adjustment or used the 12 level of-
fense level increase, but not that for criminal history, the sentence was
affirmed.233  In United States v. Chandia,234 the Fourth Circuit vacated a
sentence based on the district court’s unsupported application of the en-
hancement, but permitted its imposition on remand if the court found the
necessary intent.235
Cases involving a substantial downward adjustment of the enhance-
ment-based Guidelines sentence have, however, frequently resulted in re-
versal.  In United States v. Stewart,236 the Second Circuit admitted that
differentiation might be possible among defendants subject to the en-
hancement.237  Nonetheless, it vacated a sentence that “substantially va-
ried from the applicable Guidelines range”238 because it regarded the
sentence as “strikingly low.”239  The court recognized that the enhance-
ment, like any guideline, was not mandatory.240  However, it reached a
similar result, in effect, by tying support for terror to § 3553(a).  The
court focused on the fact that the sentencing statute requires the trial
court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and “the
need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense.”241  Other courts have reached the same results after engaging in a
comprehensive review of the trial judge’s application of § 3553(a).242  In
United States v. Ressam, the court stated that “[t]he abuse of discretion
standard is deferential, but it does not mean anything goes.”243
These disagreements with sentencing decisions have provoked
sharp dissents on several grounds.  Dissenting in United States v. Abu
Ali,244 Judge Motz contended that the court was using a special form of
less deferential review for terrorism cases.245  The more basic criticism is
232 See, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011).
233 See e.g., U.S. v. Thomas, 521 F.App’x 741 (11th Cir. 2013).
234 514 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2008).
235 Id. at 376.
236 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009).
237 Id. at 144.
238 Id. at 146.
239 Id. at 148.
240 Id. at 151.
241 Id. at 144, 151 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
242 See, e.g., United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1088–96 (9th Cir. 2012) (reviewing
and disagreeing with application of factors).
243 Id. at 1087.
244 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008).
245 Id. at 271 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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that appellate courts that, in effect, enforce the enhancement are deviat-
ing from the Supreme Court’s limitation of their role.  Dissenting in
Jayyousi,246 Judge Barkett accused the majority of having made the
guidelines “mandatory.”247  What appears to be at work is a stretching of
the post-Booker appellate role in cases where the reviewing court con-
cludes that the trial judge paid lip service to the enhancement, but then
largely disregarded it, perhaps out of hostility toward it.
IV. THE ENHANCEMENT GOING FORWARD: INSTITUTIONAL ROLES
AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The terrorism enhancement is an important component of American
counter-terrorism policy, given the role that prosecutions in Article III
courts play in that policy.  At the same time, the enhancement is contro-
versial—both in terms of its harsh approach to a broad range of terrorism
offenses and in terms of its role as one of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Of
course, debate over the enhancement must be situated in the broader con-
text of debates over sentencing policy in general.248  Flaws in the concept
might result in pressure for change, but there is a serious question as to
where change might come from.  One possibility is Congress, since the
enhancement itself stemmed from congressional directives to the Sen-
tencing Commission to promulgate one.249  It is virtually certain that
Congress will not change its mind on an issue that is part of its tough-on-
terrorism approach.  Recent National Defense Authorization Acts250
show just how entrenched that policy is.  There is concern over how to
reconcile civil liberties with national security, as the controversy over
surveillance shows.251  It is exceedingly unlikely, however, that this con-
cern extends to the sentences meted out to those guilty of “federal crimes
of terror.”
The Sentencing Commission also does not appear to be a source for
change.  It promulgated the specific enhancement—§ 3A1.4 of the
Guidelines—albeit under general congressional directive.  The enhance-
ment does not appear to represent a situation like the controversy over
246 United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011).
247 Id. at 1130 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
248 See generally SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 67–132
(8th ed. 2007).
249 McLoughlin, supra note 18, at 51. R
250 E.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84,
123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
251 This is a recurring theme in virtually all debates over counter-terrorism policy.  For
example, President Obama stated that “in the years to come, we will have to keep working
hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those free-
doms that make us who we are.”  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the
National Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
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the crack cocaine guidelines, where the Commission and Congress had
serious, ongoing policy differences.252  In any event, Congress must ap-
prove changes to the Guidelines.253  It disapproved proposed changes in
the cocaine area254 and would certainly do so here.  This leaves us with
the courts.  There would be something unsettling—particularly in terms
of separation of powers—in the notion of federal courts making general
sentencing policy for terrorism cases.  If, however, the problem is seen as
one of applying existing sentencing policy—embodied both in the con-
gressional directives and the Guidelines—it becomes both more familiar
and more manageable.  But even in this role, courts will inevitably be
drawn into the controversy over whether the enhancement represents
sound policy.
The case for the policy behind the enhancement is strong.  Terror-
ism is different from other crimes.  Terrorist acts can intimidate a civilian
population and disrupt entire communities.  Anyone who lived in Boston
after April 15, 2013 can attest to that.255  Potential effects on infrastruc-
ture are equally severe.  The proverbial dirty bomb at the New York
Stock Exchange would kill and injure many people as well as cripple
much of the nation’s economy, as would a successful attack on the air
transportation system.  The nation showed remarkable resiliency after
September 11, 2001, but if terrorists were to succeed now, with all the
efforts devoted to thwarting them, the results would put that resiliency to
the test.  If terrorists are to be tried in the regular criminal justice system,
harsh sentences seem to be a fair trade-off.  More importantly, Congress
has spoken.  The enhancement represents a major national policy goal.
Much of the counter-terrorism effort is focused on prevention,256
the “goal of all goals,” in the words of former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales.257  The criminal law reflects this focus, particularly through
the crimes involving “material support” to terrorists.258  In Holder v. Hu-
manitarian Law Project,259 the Supreme Court upheld a material support
statute in the face of a serious First Amendment challenge.260  It also
252 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–99 (2007). See Mcloughlin, supra
note 18, at 59–60 (discussing interaction between Congress and Commission).
253 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
254 See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 99.
255 See, e.g., Editorial, Bombs at the Marathon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, at A26, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/opinion/bombs-at-the-boston-marathon.html (dis-
cussing the Boston Marathon bombing).
256 Chesney, supra note 15, at 429–33. R
257 Id. at 425.
258 Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention
Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 680–92 (2009).
259 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
260 Id. at 2722–30.
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gave a clear signal of endorsement of the concept of prevention.261  If
prevention is at the heart of counter-terrorism, harsh sentences seem ap-
propriate here as well.
It is true that the enhancement has been the object of a number of
criticisms.  These range from constitutional objections,262 to a critique of
arbitrariness,263 to a penological view of undue harshness.264  There are
answers to these critiques.  For example, the advisory nature of the
Guidelines cuts against the constitutional argument.265  The notion that
the enhancement represents somehow “inferior” policy stands in direct
contrast to its congressional origins.  Still, there is a constitutional risk in
emphasizing Congress’s role, or in any push towards treating this guide-
line as somehow binding. Booker forbids this result.  Yet if trial courts
feel they have to apply the enhancement and appellate courts make sure
they do, the result is a mandatory guideline.266  It falls to the courts to
navigate these uncertain waters.  They need to give meaningful applica-
tion to the enhancement, exercise their congressionally mandated role
under § 3553(a), and remain faithful to their larger duty to do justice.
First, let us consider how trial judges should approach application of
the enhancement.  Policy issues should be out of bounds.  These argu-
ments include whether the enhancement is unworthy of respect, whether
it is unduly harsh, and whether its use of criminal history is arbitrary.  On
the other hand, individual concerns, such as the need to “provide just
punishment,”267 and the need to “protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant,”268 ought to permit differentiation.  This focus on the
defendant is emphasized by the fact that § 3553(a) begins with the admo-
nition that the court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the more specific factors of § 3553(a).
It will be helpful to apply these general considerations to a specific
class of cases: prosecutions for provision of “material support” to ter-
rorists and terrorist organizations.269  Some cases are straightforward,
such as the provision of funds or other material.270  The issue becomes
more difficult in the area of preventive prosecutions.  The definition of
261 Id. at 2726–27.
262 See supra Part II.B.
263 See supra text accompanying notes 180–84.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 182–84.
265 See, e.g., United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 824 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We have re-
jected variants of this [constitutional] argument countless times, and we do so again here.”).
266 United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1130 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett J., dissent-
ing) (warning against sentencing practices that “inappropriately [treat] the Guidelines as
mandatory”).
267 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
268 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C).
269 Id. §§ 2339A–2339B.
270 See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 483–84 (5th Cir. 2011).
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material support includes “personnel,” “which may include oneself.”271
Thus, defendants who have sought military training abroad,272 or sworn
an oath to al-Qaeda while expressing a willingness to lend their talents to
it in the future,273 have been the subject of material support prosecutions.
The material support statutes are the principal means of getting at would-
be terrorists, including those in the early stages of development.274  If
convicted, these individuals are subject to the enhancement.275  It is cases
like these that may call for differentiation and an application of the en-
hancement that permits it through downward deviation.
There will, of course, be hard cases.  The surviving Boston Mara-
thon bomber faces serious penalties if found guilty.276  What of his
friends, who allegedly helped conceal evidence after the fact, at his re-
quest?277  Are they equally deserving of a substantially enhanced sen-
tence?  They can probably be fitted under the enhancement, subject to
statutory maximums.  The question is whether they should be and how
§ 3553(a)’s call for differentiation should apply.
What room, if any, is there in this scenario for appellate courts?
One might contend that, if the trial court follows the Gall sequence and
uses the magic words of incantation of § 3553(a), such room does not
exist.  However, as the cases discussed in Part III indicate, appellate
courts seem willing to use “substantive reasonableness” review to per-
271 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A)(b)(1).
272 It should be noted that some such cases will involve more than seeking military train-
ing.  For example, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011), did not
solely involve seeking military training abroad.  In his case Mehanna had, for example, en-
gaged in substantial Internet activity that allegedly constituted support for al-Quaeda.  Profes-
sor Chesney discusses the case of Hamid Hayat, who apparently received training abroad,
expressed pro-jihad sentiments, and indicated a desire to engage in violent acts in the United
States. See Chesney, supra note 15, at 487–92.  Dissenting in the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance R
of Hayat’s conviction, Judge Tashima stated, “To paraphrase a famous line, in this case, the
government has concluded that it is not for it to say what offense Hamid Hayat has committed,
but it is satisfied that he committed some offense, for which he should be punished.”  United
States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 904 (9th Cir. 2013).
273 United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 2011).
274 See generally Chesney, supra note 258, at 680–92 (discussing the purpose and appli- R
cation of various material support statutes).
275 For example, in Mehanna the judge’s discussion of sentencing makes it clear that he
began with the enhancement. See Transcript of Disposition at 11–12, United States v.
Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2012).  The judge ultimately did not apply the
Guidelines but arrived, nonetheless, at a sentence of 210 months. See id. at 69–70, 74.
276 See Indictment, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 1:13-cr-10200 (D. Mass. June 27,
2013) (charging violations of eight federal laws).
277 Maria Sacchetti, Tsarnaev School Friends Indicted, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2013, at
A1, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/08/08/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-college-
friends-indicted-for-allegedly-impeding-boston-marathon-bombing-investigation/NGumWgr1
lOjTj0GaHDv5HJ/story.html.
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form a searching inquiry into a given application of § 3553(a) and pre-
serve a meaningful role for the enhancement.278
The answer to this dilemma, I contend, is to recognize the validity
of a special role for appellate courts in reviewing sentences in terrorism
cases.  Judge Motz was right in suggesting this happens,279 but wrong in
saying it is a bad idea.  Let us start with the fact that the concept of the
enhancement did not originate with the Sentencing Commission, but with
Congress.  As argued above, this fact should entitle the enhancement to
more deference, not less.280  Congress is the ultimate source of basic sen-
tencing policies and, with the President, shares the central role in na-
tional counter-terrorism policy.
Still, as recognized throughout this Article, any such approach runs
into the Booker problem.  In particular, pushing the appellate role too far
may be in direct conflict with Gall.  Congress’s role in directing the crea-
tion of an enhancement may not provide an escape route from that con-
flict.  It is true that the Court has noted that “Congress has shown that it
knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms.”281  But after
Booker, Congress cannot direct the manner in which a judge applies a
sentencing factor if that application involves fact-finding.  Thus, the con-
gressional imprimatur only goes so far.
On the other hand, Gall does not always impose an absolute ban to a
substantial appellate role.  The Court’s discussion of reasonableness re-
view emphasized deference and warned against de novo review.282
However, the Court stated that in reviewing outside-Guidelines sentences
“appellate courts may . . . take the degree of variance into account and
consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines.”283  One is
tempted to throw up one’s hands and say that you can find in Booker and
its progeny anything you want.  However, Judge Barkett may be right in
viewing a special standard of appellate review of sentencing in terrorism
cases as contrary to Booker.284
It is at this point that considerations of national security deference
tilt the balance in favor of that special standard.  The Supreme Court has,
on several occasions, appeared to utilize a form of national security def-
erence that makes the difference in close cases.  For example: Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project285 illustrates this in the substantive area of
278 See supra Part III and cases cited supra notes 203–247. R
279 See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 271–72 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J.,
dissenting).
280 See supra text accompanying notes 181–188. R
281 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007).
282 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 56, 59 (2007).
283 Id. at 47.
284 See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1086, 1130 (11th Cir. 2011).
285 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
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protected speech; Ashcroft v. Iqbal286 seems to be an example in the
pleading context.  National security deference is clearly present in last
term’s standing discussion in Clapper v. Amnesty International,287 where
the old chestnuts of Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War288 and United States v. Richardson289—which might have been seen
as generalized grievances290—were repackaged as representing national
security standing denials.291  Going from a national security standing to a
national security scope of review in sentencing cases is not a big jump.
What remains to be seen is an explicit recognition of the concept.  The
appellate courts need not adopt a per se role.  They can allow for differ-
entiation when it is clearly warranted under § 3553(a).  However, terror-
ism cases will be different.
CONCLUSION
The uncertain judicial role in federal sentencing practice is here to
stay.  So is the terrorism enhancement.  They clash, in what might be
called a judicial perfect storm.  This Article advances the view that the
enhancement must play a meaningful role, at both the trial and appellate
levels.  It falls to the courts to give effect to this important component of
national counter-terrorism policy.  There must be room for differentiation
in sentencing in terrorism cases.  There must also be room for searching
appellate review to ensure that differentiation does not involve nullifying
the enhancement.  Any special rule for terrorism cases may be in tension
with Booker and its progeny.  But Booker is already in tension with it-
self.  Thus, although the approach advocated here highlights that tension,
it did not create it.
286 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
287 See 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
288 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
289 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
290 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93–94 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing Schles-
inger and Richardson in the context of generalized grievances).  Indeed, the Court in Richard-
son referred to the plaintiff as one seeking “to air his generalized grievances about the conduct
of government.”  418 U.S. at 175.
291 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147.
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APPENDIX292
292 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, SENTENCING TABLE, ch. 5, pt. A (2013),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2013_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Sentencing_
Table.pdf.
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